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ABSTRACT 
COLTON V. ACOSTA: Hart or Dworkin: Who Better Illuminates the Nature of 
International Law? 
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Westmoreland) 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore two legal theorists’ conceptions of law and 
adjudication and then to use those conceptions to analyze which conception better 
illuminates the nature of international law.  Hart thinks that a mature legal system is 
composed of primary and secondary rules.  For Hart, whether a legal system exists is a 
matter of value-neutral social fact; a legal system is unified by formal criteria of validity 
that constitute the fundamental rule of the system.  Law in no way relies on moral 
principles.  Hart’s theory for international law culminates in viewing international law as 
decidedly law, but an underdeveloped form of it. Dworkin views law as best explained 
and justified by introducing the idea that integrity, as a moral principle, gives the best 
explanation of what unifies a legal system and how judges decide cases.  Dworkin 
conceives of legal claims as being inherently interpretive moral claims, and deciding 
what the law is in a hard case requires reference to irreducibly moral principles.  I will 
attempt to advance my thesis that after applying both of these conceptions to the field of 
international law, Dworkin’s theory better explains how law is both a social and 
institutional fact and a normative enterprise.  His theory better explains how international 
law is justified in its normative aims through the principle of salience, and further gives a 
future, evolved vision for international law which would enable it to acquire a more 
effective place in the international community.  Dworkin’s addition of moral principles 
  iii. 
(and his model of sovereign states recognizing principles that have moral weight) to a set 
of rules serves to explain and justify international law as law in the fullest sense, and 
gives it a more powerful and significant place in the global community. 
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II. Introduction 
 
 The question I will attempt to address throughout this paper is as follows: given 
its enormous and perhaps fundamental differences from municipal law, is it possible to 
consider international law as law at all, and, if so, how and to what extent?  I will 
examine Hart’s legal positivist theory and Dworkin’s natural law theory to determine 
which of these better illuminates the nature of international law.  My thesis is that not 
only can we definitively conceive of international law as law, but that Dworkin is right 
that law is best conceived as a social institution whose various formal features are 
ultimately united by moral principles, and this better illuminates the nature of 
international law. Dworkin’s conception of the nature and purpose of law, with his 
conception of salient moral principles that thus have moral weight as the justification for 
international law, better explains and justifies international law as law in the fullest sense, 
and furthermore gives a future picture for international law that would give the field a 
more definite, justified, and effective place in the global community. 
 This project began in a more general form; that is, I wanted to address the issue of 
international law, and how it related to the international community as a whole.  From 
there, my interest in legal philosophy encouraged me to combine these topics into one 
question. To answer the ultimate question above, I will first ask the question: what is law, 
and how do we both identify and conceive of it?  It is important first to understand this 
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question so as to decide whether international law is really law at all.  Once I sketch two 
conceptions of law, I will apply these conceptions to international law. 
The first conception of law that I will analyze is H.L.A. Hart’s, who was a 
prominent legal positivist.  Legal positivism asserts that there is no necessary or 
conceptual connection between law and morality.  The question of whether something is 
a law is wholly independent of whether that law is right or good.  Hart’s famous work, 
The Concept of Law, was first written as a guide to law for undergraduate students but 
quickly became one of the foremost works in legal philosophy.1  The Concept of Law 
sparked debate that continues today, and I will address at least some of these debates in 
this paper.  Hart’s conception of law is perhaps most famous for his departure from 
previous positivists, including John Austin’s legal positivism, which involved the notion 
that “a general habit of obedience” to the commands of a legally unlimited sovereign is 
the essence of a legal system.2  Austin’s theory is decidedly non-normative; his concept 
of obligation is purely predictive.  His theory of obligation is, for example: “If you do not 
do x, you will suffer y,” and this is a perfect example of a non-normative predictive 
analysis.  Hart argues that a legal system is a system of primary and secondary rules, 
where primary rules are duty-imposing rules to citizens and secondary rules are about 
modifying and recognizing (i.e. the rule of recognition) the primary rules.  In addition to 
making statements of obligation purely predictive statements, Austin’s reductive view 
distorts the function of secondary rules, which in many cases confer powers rather than 
restrain or constrain.  He attempts to find a balance between Austin’s positivism and a 
more refined positivism that accounts for the normativity of law.  His view still aims to 
                                                 
1 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 238. 
2 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 24. 
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reject “natural law” views that hold that law is necessarily connected to morality. Hart 
also has an interesting section at the end of his The Concept of Law simply called 
“International Law”, which I will explore at length later in this paper. 
 The other author whose conception of law I wish to address is Ronald Dworkin.  
Dworkin attacks Hart’s conception of law on numerous occasions throughout his book, 
Law’s Empire.  Dworkin’s position is that judges should adjudicate in a manner described 
as “law as integrity”,3 in which judges interpret cases in a way that allows the outcome to 
help the legal system be the best that it can be. He makes the claim that this form of 
adjudication is the best (in a politically moral and legal sense) way to decide cases.  
Dworkin attempts to show that other conceptions of law are merely imperfect forms of 
his law as integrity, and that proper interpretation of legal issues and cases will (and 
should) ultimately result in a decision that best justifies black-letter law.  This is 
obviously different from Hart’s theory, because Dworkin’s conception of law relies on 
moral principles to identify law.  His position is that morality is connected to law through 
moral principles which should be consulted by each judge and lawyer; what the law is in 
a hard or controversial case requires reference to established moral principles.  His ideas 
on certainty and objectivity in cases is also important to this topic, and I will address 
them at length later on in this paper. 
 Finally, I will analyze several statutes that make up the sources of international 
law, in order that I might both try to understand the sources of law in this field and to 
apply Hart and Dworkin’s conceptions of law to these sources.  The importance of this 
analysis is that these conceptions of law may be applied to actual statutes of international 
                                                 
3 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1986), 239. 
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law, if indeed this field counts as law in the fullest sense. I will attempt to show that 
Dworkin’s view of law, and by extension of international law, is vastly superior to Hart’s 
in that it allows us to better conceive of international law as law at all, and also enables us 
to better understand law as both a social fact and a normative enterprise.  This will allow 
Dworkin to set up a future for international law which explains how it could become law 
in the fullest sense, which is to say truly coercive and justified to coerce. This explanation 
of international law is important for such issues as global cooperation, the practice of 
international lawyers, and indeed for every member of the global community. 
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II. Analysis of Hart’s Legal Positivism 
 
 Hart begins by criticizing the “classical” legal positivism of Austin, who asserts 
that “law is constructed from commands, threats, and obedience.  A sovereign is a person 
or group who enjoys the habitual obedience of most others but does not habitually obey 
anyone else. Law is a general command of a sovereign backed by threat of force”.4  
Austin asserts that sovereignty must be absolute, because a “limited” sovereign would 
have to be limited by law, and since law is command, there would be something above 
the sovereign, which must be the real, unlimited sovereign issuing the commands.  Hart 
thought that Austin is right that the question of whether something is law is independent 
of whether it is good, but he rejects important aspects of Austin’s positivism.  The nature 
of law can only be understood if both sets of rules are understood as norms and standards 
evaluating behavior, rather than merely orders backed by threats.  Yet Hart stresses that 
any connection between law and morality is contingent, not necessary.  He thus rejects a 
natural law theory that purports that morality is necessarily tied to law.   
 In most modern governments, there is no absolute sovereign that rules with 
legally unlimited authority; for instance, in America we have a body of legislators who 
are elected by the population, and are expected to serve the population.  Hart makes the 
important distinction that in modern times we do not have an absolute, legally unlimited 
sovereign; we instead have a sovereign that is limited in that the officials act in two 
                                                 
4 Leslie Green, “Introduction” The Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), xx. 
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capacities - in a public way, as elected representatives, and in a private way, as citizens.5  
This leads to his main point, which is that every branch of government can be legally 
limited.  There is no Austinian “absolute sovereign” in Hart’s theory. Thus there can be 
criteria, recognized by judges, which can limit the power of all government officials and 
bodies.  This is important because it allows us to view our government officials in both 
public and private capacities, and as being significantly limited, which will be helpful 
later in this paper when we examine international state sovereignty. 
 Austin’s law as command model distorts even duty-imposing rules; these rules are 
not simply predictions of what the state will do in the event of disobedience.  Rather, the 
rules are established social norms.  We typically apply these norms as standards of 
behavior, rather than as a mere commands or predictions, and organize our lives by these 
standards.  Austin’s model further distorts the power-conferring (secondary) rules that are 
undoubtedly present in a legal system (see below).  Austin’s simple command model, 
therefore, captures little of the scope of legal systems.  Hart further departs from Austin 
in that he distinguishes between an “external” and “internal” point of view.6  The external 
point of view is shared by of someone not bound by the rules of law, and sees them as 
merely exertions of force.  The internal point of view is shared by someone who is 
governed by the rules and accepts the rules as standards of conduct.  Hart attempts to fill 
these gaps in the classical positivist theory with his internal (and thus normative) primary 
and secondary rules. Thus, we come to Hart’s unique claim and conception of law. 
 
 
                                                 
5 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 75. 
6 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 56-57. 
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A. Law as Primary and Secondary Rules 
 One of the main issues Hart takes with past positivists is illustrated above; that is, 
the issue of all laws being commands.  Hart writes that laws conferring the power to 
make contracts, wills, and marriages are important types of law that are completely and 
utterly obscured by the notion of all laws being orders backed by threats.7  We must 
recognize other legal rules (such as laws involving the creation and powers of the 
legislature, those who “make” and “create” laws) that are not mere orders backed by 
threats.  Hart considers the idea, advanced by some Austinians, that these “power-
conferring laws” are merely fragments of orders backed by threats.  This seems to 
“distort”, writes Hart, “the ways in which these laws are used in everyday life”.8  It is 
difficult to view a marriage license as a fragment of an order backed by a threat of 
punishment, since there is nothing in the law that requires our marrying one another. 
 The other issue with this command model, writes Hart, is with the figure of a 
sovereign.  It is impossible to deny the existence and necessity of some standard for 
creating and identifying law in a legal system, but Hart takes issue with the figure of a 
sovereign to do this, as has been advanced in the past by Austin.  He writes that Austin’s 
view creates a problem for the succession of sovereigns.  He illustrates these reasons as 
follows.9  In some imagined system of government there is an absolute monarch as a 
sovereign called Rex, and this system is primitive enough that everyone accepts Rex’s 
commands as law without question.  That is, a habit of obedience is formed between each 
member of the population and Rex as sovereign.  Rex continues to rule with absolute 
                                                 
7 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 75. 
8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 80. 
9 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 52. 
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authority for a very long time until he dies.  Before he does, he appoints his successor and 
son, Rex II, to rule after his death.   
 The issue here, of course, is what gives Rex II the right to rule as sovereign?  He 
is not the same person as Rex I, and is certainly by that logic not the same sovereign.  
Hart writes, “There is nothing to make him sovereign from the start.  Only after we know 
that his orders have been obeyed for some time shall we be able to say that a habit of 
obedience has been established”.10  Hart maintains that what Rex II says, before this habit 
of obedience is established, cannot be law if we understand that law is orders backed by 
threats of an absolute sovereign as defined by Austin.  For there has been nothing to 
make him sovereign yet. This is one of Hart’s problems with Austin’s positivism; there 
must be a standard that identifies Rex II as sovereign, if Rex II’s enactments are to be law 
from the beginning and the legal system or polity is to have continuity.  
 The answer, to anyone who intelligently thinks for a short while (or who consults 
Hart’s argument), is obvious: something like a rule of succession or right to succeed must 
exist.  However, as Hart writes, that is clearly a new element that is introduced into this 
imagined scenario.  Without this, Rex II has no authority to make laws, or even to 
succeed his father Rex I as sovereign.  Another aspect to this, and one which is perhaps 
more familiar to citizens of modern governments, involves statutes which continue to be 
law even after those who made the laws are dead.11  Hart cites Thomas Hobbes in 
reference to his theory: “the legislator is he, not by whose authority the laws were first 
made, but by whose authority they now continue to be laws”.12 
                                                 
10 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 53. 
11 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 62. 
12 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 63. 
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 This particular aspect of sovereignty introduces the idea of what Hart calls tacit 
commands, which are different from explicit commands in that they are merely not 
overruled by the one who “tacitly commands”, rather than directly given as commands.  
Take, for instance, the scenario in which a CEO learns that his or her second-in-command 
is explicitly ordering new associates to work unreasonable hours.  Rather than stop these 
orders, though, the CEO allows them to continue, thus, according to this illustration, 
tacitly ordering them.  Thus the laws given by the government today could count as tacit 
commands (and indeed, are often viewed as such) from the government who first wrote 
or enforced the laws.  However, Hart writes, laws made by previous members of 
Congress are not laws because they are tacitly commanded by those present members; 
they are laws because they issued from a valid source of law.  But what is this valid 
source of law in Hart’s theory?  He writes that this is the “rule of recognition”.13  The 
sovereign cannot be the foundation of law; the rule of recognition must act as the 
foundation for identifying what the law is in a given legal system. In the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain, for example, the rule of recognition can be as follows: “Whatever the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law”.14 The rule of recognition is vital to a legal system, 
according to Hart, because it is a customary norm that authoritatively identifies the law 
for judges in that system.  I will illuminate this further in a few pages. 
 Hart writes that all this requires a revised positivist conception of law, one that 
encompasses and resolves these difficulties and also explains law as a social practice; he 
calls his conception of law “law as the union of primary and secondary rules”.15  Primary 
                                                 
13 Leslie Green, “Introduction” The Concept of Law, xx. 
14 Leslie Green, “Introduction” The Concept of Law, xxi. 
15 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 79. 
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rules are those under which people “are required to do or to abstain from certain actions, 
whether they wish to or not”,16 while under secondary rules, people are given the power 
to do or say certain things “[that may] introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish 
or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their 
operations”.17  In other words, the secondary rules can modify or create new primary 
rules, and can modify their scope or range.  A system of primary rules is 
indistinguishable from social morality; the secondary rules give us the ability to alter or 
adapt the primary rules according to society’s changes, in social morality or otherwise.  
Why are the secondary rules necessary? Is it possible that law could merely consist of 
primary rules alone, in which primary rules also contain power-conferring rules?  Hart 
denies this for three reasons18.   
 In a system with only primary rules, there is 1) uncertainty, as there is no criterion 
for establishing what the rules of the system are. 2) The primary rules are static, as there 
is no means of changing the rules. 3) The primary rules alone are inefficient, and a system 
of only primary rules has no authoritative way of determining when rules have been 
breached, or of punishing breaches.  The solution to all of these problems with the mere 
“primary rules system” involves incorporation of the secondary rules. 
  The rule of recognition is necessary because there must be some authoritative 
way to identify laws.  It is a decidedly judicial custom, consisting of criteria that identify 
valid sources of law.  A rule is valid if it is identified by the rule of recognition; if it is 
not, it cannot be a valid rule.  The rule of recognition therefore is the authoritative way of 
                                                 
16 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 81. 
17 Ibid. 
18 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 91 - 92. 
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identifying each rule of law in a given legal system.  The rule of recognition cannot be 
valid or invalid, because it is a judicial custom by which judges identify the law.  In the 
United States, the rule of recognition could be: ‘Whatever bill the President signs is law’ 
or ‘Whatever the Constitution says is law’, thus identifying several sources of law; there 
does not need to be only one source of law that a rule of recognition recognizes.  This 
rule of recognition is fundamental to a legal system, as it “provides criteria of legal 
validity by determining which acts create law”.19  Therefore laws are created, according 
to Hart, not on the basis of some moral qualification, or by the will of a sovereign, but 
because there is a customary rule, already in practice, that recognizes them as such.  This 
aligns with his positivism that asserts that law is law in virtue of certain value-neutral 
social facts.  This is separate from the issue of what is right and wrong. 
 
B. Law and Morality 
 This leads to the question of Hart’s views on the relationship between law and 
morality.  Many theorists have critiqued his view that law and morality are conceptually 
separate from one another, and have thus concluded that he means that morality has no 
place in law nor does law contain any influence from morality.  However, that is 
emphatically not Hart’s claim, as I shall show in the following section.  He instead claims 
that there is a contingent relationship between law and morality, but emphatically not a 
necessary one.  Hart writes that: 
  The main theme of this book is that so many of the distinctive operations of the  
 law…require for their elucidation reference to one or both of these two types of  
                                                 
19 Leslie Green, “Introduction” The Concept of Law, xxi. 
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 rule [primary and secondary rules], that their union may be justly regarded as the  
 ‘essence’ of law, though they may not always be found together wherever the  
 word ‘law’ is correctly used.20 
 He makes this distinction because he is arguing that the primary and secondary 
rules are not mere commands, nor do they have a necessary connection to moral rules and 
principles.  Thus he argues against a kind of “natural law theory”, which purports that 
there is in fact a necessary connection between law and morality. Under “natural law”, it 
also follows that “law” which is immoral is defective as law, and so is not a central case 
of a legal system. 
 Hart works to discredit this view by showing that there are distinct differences 
between morality and law which must point to morality being a separate entity from law.  
These are the differences of: 1) importance, as there is a large degree of importance 
attached to moral claims and moral truths, in the serious social pressure one faces to 
conform to these truths; this importance, which is essential to all moral claims, is “not 
essential to the status of all legal rules as it is to that of morals”,21 and 2) deliberate 
change, that is morals are immune from deliberate change, in a way that laws are not. 
This distinction will prove very important when we come to the next section on 
international law, as many claims of international law seem to rely on some idea of 
morality as their justification rather than statutes or past legal decisions. 
 Before moving on to the next section on international law, however, I want to 
address Hart’s developed stance on the connection between law and morality.  As I 
mentioned above, many of his critics have claimed that he purports that there is no 
                                                 
20 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 155. 
21 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 175. 
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connection whatsoever between law and morality.  He does, however, claim that there is 
a contingent relationship between law and morality.  Hart writes: 
  It cannot seriously be disputed that the development of law…has in fact been  
 profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular  
 social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by   
 individuals, whose moral horizon has transcended the morality currently   
 accepted.22 
 This statement establishes his view that there is undoubtedly a contingent 
connection between law and morality, but morality is not a necessary, inherent part of 
law.  A union of primary and secondary rules is law regardless of its moral qualities; Nazi 
law is law, that is, if it meets the formal criteria of law (that is, if there is a valid rule of 
recognition which judges use to decide cases, and the system is efficacious).  There is no 
need to question the legal system as a real legal system; all legal systems meeting the 
formal criteria of a legal system are law and are social fact.  Thus, the iniquity of a legal 
system does not make it a marginal or defective instance of law; rather, it is a fully-
formed and functioning legal system if it meets the formal criteria of law.  
 Hart writes, therefore, that we must accept as laws those which occur in a 
“iniquitous”, but nonetheless legal, system, even if we feel that the system is a bad one 
and condemn it on moral grounds.  “Study of its [that is, law as conceived of primary and 
secondary rules as a specific method for social control] use involves study of its abuse”,23 
writes Hart, and concludes finally: 
                                                 
22 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 185. 
23 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 210. 
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  A concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be distinguished from its  
 immorality, enables us to see the complexity and variety of these separate issues;  
 whereas a narrow concept of law which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules  
 may blind us to them.24 
Remember that for Hart, classical positivism misses the normative aspect of law in a way 
that leaves a gap in the classical positivists’ theory.  These positivists reduce law to 
orders backed by threats, but this distorts the legal system in a way that misses many of 
these normative aspects.  The primary and secondary rules are social fact and are also 
normative. This is a problem for his theory though, because in what sense is it normative 
divorced from all reference to morality?  I will address this further later. 
 
C. Is International Law Law? 
 Following this discussion on the connection between law and morality, Hart turns 
his attention to international law.  Throughout the book, Hart alludes to international law 
as being criticized for “lack[ing] a legislature, states cannot be brought before 
international courts without their prior consent, and there is no centrally organized system 
of sanctions”.25  Hart addresses these objections in his chapter, “International Law”.  Hart 
first makes the claim that: 
  The absence of these institutions [legislature, sanctions, courts with compulsory  
 jurisdiction, etc.] means that the rules for states [sovereign states such as the  
 United  States or France] resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting  
                                                 
24 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 211. 
25 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 4. 
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 only of primary rules of obligation, which, when we find it among societies of  
 individuals, we are accustomed to contrast with a developed legal system.26 
 The absence of these institutions, in other words, causes many legal theorists to 
question whether international law is really law in the truest sense, or if it is merely a 
farcical organization established to try to keep some global peace and order but that has 
no legal basis.  The question, writes Hart, is not one of mere language, but is one where 
“what is demanded - no doubt obscurely - is that the principle [of what truly constitutes 
law] be made explicit and its credentials inspected”.27 
 Hart sets out to debate two main objections, then, against international law 
counting as law: 1) that international law lacks obligations and sanctions, which concerns 
the difference in rules between international and municipal law, and 2) that states cannot 
be both independent and dependent sovereigns, which concerns the difference between 
the subjects of international and municipal law.  The first will raise a question about the 
legal sanctions in both international and municipal law, how these sanctions differ, and 
whether these differences are too great for international law to count as law; the second 
will address the differences between individuals and sovereign states in municipal and 
international law, whether states can be both independent and dependent, and question 
the legal status of international law on that basis. 
 
1. On the Rules of International Law - True, Binding Obligations? 
 Many theorists critique international law by saying that it cannot be truly binding; 
that is, that there are no valid rules that create an obligation.  What if there are no 
                                                 
26 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 214. 
27 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 215. 
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obligatory rules in international law?  If there are, what if these obligatory rules are not 
enforceable?  Obligatory means that the rules create real obligations; enforceability is the 
question: can the rules enforce these obligations?  These two issues - whether 
international law is both enforceable and obligatory - is important because the real 
question is: can international law create and enforce genuine obligations?  Is it even 
possible for there to be obligatory rules that exist within the international legal system?  
Municipal law is distinctive in that it is coercive and most of its law is enforced.  What 
happens if rules are not enforced in international law?  Actually being in force is often 
cited as a difference between law and morality.  Are these rules thus reduced to simply 
unenforceable moral standards?  That is Hart’s question here: “can such rules as these [in 
international law] be meaningfully and truthfully said ever to give rise to obligations?”.28  
 If they cannot (and international law’s critics, by showing the discipline’s lack of 
clearly organized sanctions, seem to be implying), then it is clear that international law 
cannot be classified as law, since obligation is central to law.  “All speculation about the 
nature of law begins from the assumption that its existence at least makes certain conduct 
obligatory”,29 writes Hart.  He sets aside an obvious objection to this view that 
international law does not have real, enforceable sanctions, which is Article 16 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations30 and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;31 he 
declares that these provisions do not count in the same way as municipal sanctions, since 
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there is a veto option that too often impairs these provisions.  Hart maintains that 
international law is binding to a certain extent (states accept these rules as binding rules), 
but there are very limited sanctions for enforcing them. If we accept that international law 
is not binding, we must accept (and he asserts that these objectors accept) that obligation 
is dependent on the theory that law is composed of orders backed by threats.32  However, 
as we have seen, Hart makes a distinction between obligations that are orders backed by 
threats (Austinian commands) and obligations that are normative in nature and thus guide 
behavior (you are obligated to do x; if you do not do x, a sanction (y) will follow).  Hart’s 
conception of primary and secondary rules eliminates the idea that law is only orders 
backed by threats, and asserts that instead it is a system of normative standards and rules.  
If the rules in international law resemble these primary and secondary rules (though 
without a rule of recognition), and these rules are accepted as being generally binding, 
then the lack of organized sanctions in international law does not seem such an obstacle 
to understanding binding rules in international law.   
 If, though, the opponent of international law’s obligatory nature persists in his or 
her argument by stating that ‘sanctions are necessary in municipal law, why not so for 
international law?’, then Hart continues his argument.  Municipal law is concerned with 
the actions between individuals, who, Hart writes, by their nature must be backed by 
sanctions.  Conflict between states, however, is different than conflict between 
individuals.  For one thing, violence between states is always public in nature, “on the 
world stage”, as the saying goes, and though there is no international police force, the 
violence will invariably not remain between two individuals alone.  Individuals, on the 
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other hand, interact far more often and more privately than states, and therefore the rules 
for individuals in municipal law must be more direct and individualized than international 
rules. 
 If there were no centrally organized sanctions in municipal systems, people would 
undoubtedly break the law far more often than presently,33 but years of peace go by 
between international wars and breaches of international peace.  Hart writes that these 
breaches of peace are therefore different from individual violence but must nonetheless 
be regulated by rules, albeit different rules than those in municipal law.34  Though these 
rules are different, there is still significant pressure to conform to the rules, and when the 
rules are breached, no one (in the breaching states or otherwise) insinuates that the rules 
are not binding; rather, states act very much as if they are binding, and steps are taken to 
remedy the breach.  This “significant pressure” is undoubtedly different from complete 
sanctions in that international law does not have the power to forcibly bring states before 
the international courts, but there is pressure from the international community to abide 
by the rules.  By this standard, the rules are also effective, because states are aware of 
their breaking the rules and the other states in the international community hold them 
liable to the breach.  So it would seem that, according to this argument, rules of 
international law are, at least in a limited fashion, both effective and binding. 
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2. On the Subjects of International Law - State Sovereignty? 
 “Great Britain, Belgium, Greece, Soviet Russia have rights and obligations under 
international law and so are among its subjects”;35 how exactly can we say that this is a 
true statement?  Under the notion that states are sovereign, legally independent, and 
separate legal systems, how can another legal system have any authority over them?  Hart 
regards this as one of the key objections against the binding force of international law.  
This is also different than the last objection, because while sanctions could perhaps 
eventually exist in international law, if sovereignty is inconsistent with being subject to 
international law, the entire enterprise falls apart at its very conception.  
 First, how do we understand sovereignty? As explained earlier, in historical 
jurisprudence a sovereign has been thought of as “a person above the law whose word is 
law for his [or her] inferiors or subjects”.36  Remember earlier in this paper how Hart 
mounted a (I think successful) challenge against this notion of absolute sovereignty; in 
order to understand how international law can be law, it is necessary to leave this notion 
behind.  Instead, we should understand a “state” this way: 
 First, that a population inhabiting a territory lives under that form of ordered  
 government provided by a legal system with its characteristic structure of   
 legislature, courts, and primary rules; and, secondly, that the government enjoys a  
 vaguely defined degree of independence.37 
 Hart writes that states such as Great Britain or Brazil have a large, though not 
total, degree of independence from outside legal or political control, and would qualify as 
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“sovereign states” under the discipline of international law.  While they have 
independence, they also (if they have ratified the treaty that binds them as such) are 
beholden in some ways to international law.  Hart draws an interesting comparison 
between international states and states in our United States.  States such as Arizona, 
Louisiana, and New York, as random examples, possess a large degree of independence 
even though they are largely subject to the greater nation, the federal authority of the 
United States, when it comes to matters that concern the entire nation.  They are subject 
as such because they have agreed to be so, through accepting to be part of the United 
States as a whole.  Thus Hart makes the argument that these international states have also 
consented to the authority of international law. 
 In much the same way, states such as the United States or Great Britain have a 
large degree of independence except when it comes to certain matters which concern the 
entire world.  In fact, in international law there is the concept of charters and covenants, 
in which independent, sovereign states actually give certain bodies such as the United 
Nations authority, and thereby make themselves dependent upon, and subject to, the rules 
of international law.  Thus these doubts do not invalidate international law on the basis of 
state independence and sovereignty. 
  In this section I have argued against the claims that international law fails to 
create real obligations, and that states are sovereign in a way that makes such law 
impossible.  The rules of international law are sufficiently binding and effective in 
creating limited obligations, and so that objection fails.  Furthermore, individuals are 
sufficiently different from states so that individuals can be bound by different kinds of 
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rules, and states can act both in an independent and dependent capacity through their 
consent, depending on how the legal matter in question affects the world. 
 
3. International Law: Form and Content 
 Many critics have claimed that international law is just a series of moral claims 
and principles, and not a system of laws. This argument holds some weight, writes Hart, 
because international law does not rely on one unifying rule of recognition (like most 
legal systems), but relies on customary law such as precedent, treaties, and charters, 
along with moral claims against cruelty and violence.38  But statements under 
international law are not mere moral statements; when nations disagree or agree, they 
often make no mention of any qualification of good or bad; they speak of how their 
actions comply or do not comply with international law.  There are other, separate 
instances in which states speak of each other as doing something good or bad, but Hart 
writes that these instances are different from treaties and statutes of international law.   
 Laws are changed sometimes quite easily and without reference to whether or not 
it is a good thing to do, but moral statements and principles cannot be repealed or 
amended by an act of an authority; they evolve over time with a changing community.  
The point here is that law must differ from morality, because there is no legal difficulty 
when moral principles or obligations are not enforced, but as we have seen above, there is 
a problem when a legal system does not govern its subjects’ behavior, and thus an 
effective legal system must contain laws that are binding or obligatory.  Morality is not 
merely an institutional social fact, while according to Hart, law is clearly social fact. 
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 As seen above, there are obvious similarities and differences in form and content 
between international and municipal law.  What other distinctions does Hart draw 
between these two forms of law?  One important difference concerns the notion of the 
primary norm, or what Hart has identified as his “rule of recognition”.   While most 
modern legal systems possess some ultimate rule of recognition, international law 
contains a set of customary rules that all attempt to give the sources of international law.  
International law is, therefore, less a legal system (law is systemic if united by a rule of 
recognition) and more of a set of rules.  So while this is a difference, Hart maintains that 
it is not an overly damaging one; he writes that there does not necessarily need to be a 
primary norm or one ultimate rule in international law.  Remember that this does not 
contradict his earlier claims; Hart has continually stipulated that his conception of law 
attempts to capture the essence of law.  His sense of the “essence” of law is that he is 
referring to the features of most advanced, mature legal systems which are the 
conceptually central instances of law; if international law lacks one unifying rule of 
recognition, this makes it less of a mature legal system than most mature municipal 
systems, but a legal system nonetheless.  Hart concludes, “It is, therefore, a mistake to 
suppose that a basic rule or rule of recognition is a generally necessary condition of the 
existence of rules of obligation or ‘binding’ rules.  This is not a necessity, but a 
luxury…”.39  This luxury, he asserts, is present in advanced systems of law in which the 
members of that society accept that there is a basic criterion for establishing whether a 
rule is law or not.   
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 I conclude that Hart’s view is that international law is a less developed legal 
system than municipal law, because it lacks an ultimate rule of recognition and other 
components such as an international police force.  Municipal law has enforceable 
sanctions and courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and has an ultimate rule of 
recognition.  However, international law still possesses effective rules that give sovereign 
states standards by which to behave, and this is an essential tenet in a legal system 
according to Hart’s theory.  It is, therefore, decidedly a legal system, simply because the 
rules of the system are accepted as binding on those for whom they purport to have an 
obligation, and these rules give a normative standard for actions.  Hart ends his chapter 
with a few statements that I shall highlight here, as they concisely summarize his position 
on international law: 
 Perhaps international law is at present in a stage of transition towards acceptance  
 of this [a primary norm or ultimate rule of recognition] and other forms   
 which would bring it nearer in structure to a municipal system.  Till this stage is  
 reached the analogies are surely those of function and content, not form.  Those of 
 function emerge most clearly when we reflect on the ways in which international  
 law differs from morality…The analogies of content consist in the range of  
 principles, concepts, and methods which are common to both municipal and  
 international law…no other social rules are so close to municipal law as those of  
 international law.40 
 Though the quotation is indeed lengthy, I found it extraordinarily helpful for 
analyzing fully the similarity between international and municipal law.  Hart clearly 
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thinks the similarities in content and function between the two types of law outweigh the 
differences in form.  It cannot be argued that international law has a true police force or 
system of organized sanctions, yet the rules that exist under the law are nevertheless 
recognized as binding and, while they could be more effective through more formal 
aspects of municipal systems (international police force and courts), are nevertheless 
accepted by all major members of the international community and are normative in their 
nature.   
 What remains to be analyzed, however, are whether Hart’s positivist conception 
of law is the one which better explains how international law functions and how 
international law can have an impactful place in the global community.  At this point, his 
conception has explained some idea of the essence of law; that is, a system of primary 
and secondary rules that relies on a fundamental rule of recognition that underlies our 
system of law.  A mature system is law is characterized by a rule of recognition that 
identifies law; this rule of recognition sets a legal system apart from a mere set of legal 
rules.   
 Yet Hart’s position, that law is irreducibly normative but only contingently linked 
to morality, is problematic.  There is some problem with the idea of genuine obligation 
(genuine practical reasons to adhere) completely divorced from moral considerations.  Is 
legal obligation sui generis for Hart? Or are there other criteria for establishing 
international laws beyond rules? Do international judges and lawyers argue, recognize, 
and interpret cases based on moral principles, or do they adhere to Hart’s system of 
obligatory rules?  Could adherence to moral principles explain the systemic nature of law 
better than a rule of recognition, and further, could this adherence to moral principles 
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better explain the nature of international law? In the next section I will address Ronald 
Dworkin’s claims against this positivist approach to law and analyze his conception of 
law as integrity. 
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II. Analysis of Dworkin’s Interpretivism 
 
 More than two decades after Hart’s The Concept of Law was first published, 
Ronald Dworkin published his Law’s Empire, his most systematic work of jurisprudence. 
Here Dworkin discusses his unique and fascinating conception of law, which has been 
called “law as integrity”, and “law as rule and principle”.  Dworkin’s theory is decidedly 
a natural law theory, because it argues that legal principles are moral principles of a sort.  
He sees law as an irreducibly moral enterprise; he claims that all interpretation is 
necessarily connected to and dependent upon morality and moral principles.   In the 
following pages I will discuss and analyze Dworkin’s conception of law, describe how 
this conception is different from Hart’s positivism, and then relate his conception to 
international law. 
 The first sentence of Law’s Empire reads, “It matters how judges decide cases”.41  
Also on the first page, he sets out one of his key beliefs: “There is inevitably a moral 
dimension to an action at law, and so a standing risk of a distinct form of social 
injustice”.42  He argues throughout about the “grounds” of law; that is, on what grounds 
do we determine what law is, and how to apply it?  Dworkin sets out to attack the “plain-
fact” view of law, one version of which argues that the law is identified by reference to 
solely value-neutral facts.  Dworkin also aims to denounce the pragmatist theory that in 
hard cases there is no law at all, but rather the law is whatever judges say it is and that 
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they merely pretend that there is law in hard cases. The pragmatist differs from the 
“plain-fact” proponent in that some “plain-fact” proponents (like strict conventionalists: 
more on that later) believe that there is law in controversial cases, and its identification 
and content is established by objective social fact; the pragmatist is not legally 
constrained by black-letter law and chooses the outcome that greater benefits the 
community as a whole.  He rejects these theories and others because he believes these 
conceptions are both false to the facts of legal procedure and are morally unattractive. 
 Dworkin begins by setting out a real world case43 (Riggs v. Palmer) and then 
analyzing it.  A young man called Elmer murdered his grandfather in 1882, knowing that 
once his grandfather died he stood to inherit a large part of the dead man’s estate.  
Moreover, he suspected that his grandfather, who had recently remarried, would change 
his will to include his wife and thereby leave Elmer nothing.  Unfortunately for him, his 
crime was discovered, and Elmer was convicted and sentenced to years in prison.  The 
question is: was he legally entitled to inherit the estate of the man whom he had 
murdered? Or should the grandfather’s daughters, whom Dworkin names Goneril and 
Regan and who were entitled to inherit should Elmer die before his grandfather, inherit 
Elmer’s share of the estate instead?  Goneril and Regan sued the administrator of the will, 
claiming that Elmer should not inherit the money, because they claimed that he had no 
legal right to it.  The statute of wills, under which the creation and administration of wills 
is subject, specified nothing about this instance, and therefore Elmer’s lawyer argued that 
he should inherit.  If the court went against this position, he argued, not only would it be 
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changing the will, but it would be acting from moral convictions rather than applying 
law. 
 None of the judges denied that, if the statute was read acontextually, the statute of 
wills plainly gave the inheritance to Elmer.  They disagreed, however, on what the law 
actually was in the given instance and how the pertinent statute should be read.  Here 
Dworkin draws a distinction between two senses of what a statute is: 1) a physical entity, 
as in the paper text of the document, or 2) the law created by enacting the document.  The 
judges disagreed about the second; that is, they disagreed about the law as pertaining to 
the legal rights of Elmer, Goneril, and Regan. 
 The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Gray, argued for the acontextual 
analysis of the statute.  He argued that the statute should be read with no given regard to 
the context or the original intention of the statute of wills.  This entailed that the statute 
should be read without any exception given for murderers of the deceased; he argued that 
as a matter of law, Elmer should receive the inheritance.  In an acontextual analysis, the 
black letter of the law should be upheld and there should be no circumstantial basis for 
denying this.  Thus what the statute actually said (and nothing more) should be followed 
in this case.  The majority opinion, written by Judge Earl, drew upon the statute authors’ 
intentions instead.  “It would be absurd, he thought, to suppose that the New York 
legislators who originally enacted the statute of wills intended murderers to inherit, and 
for that reason the real statute they enacted did not have that consequence”.44  
Importantly, this issue is not about what the lawmakers would have said if asked about 
this particular instance, but what a reasonable lawmaker would have replied if asked.  It 
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is too complicated and subjective to try and determine each past lawmaker’s would-be 
intention.  Notice the difference between observing a strict, literal interpretation of a 
statute and observing the legislators’ reasonable intention over the letter of the law, when 
it has “consequence[s] the legislators would have rejected if they had contemplated it”.45  
The court’s reasoning for this opinion involved what it called “general principles of 
law:…judges should construct a statute so as to make it conform as closely as possible to 
principles of justice assumed elsewhere in the law”.46  The court thus decided for the 
plaintiffs, Goneril and Regan. 
 Following the Elmer case, I find it important to relate one further case47 that 
Dworkin analyzes, as it pertains to several of his later arguments.  He refers to this as the 
McLoughlin case of 1973, in which a woman’s husband and four children were injured in 
a car accident in England.  McLoughlin differs from the previous case, Riggs, in that it is 
a common law and not a statutory case; the court decides this case by applying 
precedents, not canonical rules (like the statute of wills).  Upon her arrival to the hospital 
following the accident, and learning that her daughter was dead and her other family 
members were in critical condition, Mrs. McLoughlin went into nervous shock.  After 
this, Mrs. McLoughlin sued the other driver, as well as other people who were involved 
in other ways, to compensate for her emotional suffering.  Her lawyer referenced earlier 
cases in which close friends or relatives had recovered (received compensation) upon 
seeing serious injury to their loved ones.  However, these people had all either been at the 
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scene of the accident or had arrived minutes later.  Mrs. McLoughlin’s lawyer 
nevertheless relied on these past cases as precedents.48 
 Judges can read precedents in two ways; they can either choose to follow each 
precedent exactly without regards to circumstance, or they can follow past decisions to 
the extent that the decisions are sufficiently wrong in the particular instance to warrant a 
different decision.  The trial judge in this case thought that Mrs. McLoughlin’s seeing her 
family later on was an important difference from past precedents because it meant that 
her emotional injuries were not “foreseeable” as were the others.49  Therefore, those 
particular past precedents did not truly apply to this decision.  The judge instead relied on 
the circumstances and the doctrine of foreseeability.  Foreseeability is the idea that 
“people who act carelessly are liable only for reasonably foreseeable injuries to others, 
injuries a reasonable person would anticipate if he [or she] reflected on the matter”.50  
The judge therefore decided not to award compensation to Mrs. McLoughlin.  When she 
appealed the case, the British Court of Appeals did not overturn the judgment, but 
disagreed and said that it was foreseeable that a mother would rush to the hospital and be 
emotionally damaged by seeing some of her family dead and some injured.  They did not 
award damages, though, because they held that it would set a precedent which would lead 
economically to an inadvisable end; too many people would receive damages for things 
in which they were not directly involved.51 
 When she appealed the decision once more to the House of Lords, though, their 
lordships reversed the decision and ordered a new trial.  While their decision was 
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unanimous, they ordered a new trial on different grounds.  Some said that it was not a 
sufficient reason to withhold damages simply because of the increased liability, as the 
Court of Appeals had held.  Two of them, however, had a different thought.  They held 
that it was wrong for the court to withhold damages for the kinds of reasons52 the lower 
courts had given; they held that “the precedents should be regarded as 
distinguishable…only if the moral principles assumed in the earlier cases…did not apply 
to the plaintiff in the same case”.53  Once it is allowed that it is foreseeable that a mother 
would be emotionally damaged by seeing her family in such a state, then it naturally 
follows that “no difference in moral principle can be found between the two cases”.54  It 
would be wrong, they maintained, however much the outcome may cost the community 
as a whole, to decide a case which conflicted with enforcing individual rights and duties 
as judges of the law.   
 This distinction here sets up Dworkin’s belief that principles articulate rights, 
while policies articulate collective goals.   Dworkin sets up a distinction between a policy 
and a principle, which I shall summarize briefly in this short paragraph.  A policy is “e.g. 
a measure to increase GDP or decrease carbon emissions”.  A principle, in contrast, is a 
standard that should be observed because there is a moral requirement that demands it, 
e.g. “each citizen has a moral right to live without fear of unwarranted search or seizure”.  
A case should not be decided by policy (more on that later), but by reference to moral 
principles.  Policy should be enacted by legislatures, not courts. This distinction is crucial 
to Dworkin’s concept of law as integrity, which I will sketch shortly. 
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 I explain these cases here in this section, before moving on to Dworkin’s 
conception of law, for the same reasons that Dworkin does in the beginning of his book.  
He wanted to show that there are many cases in which judges certainly decide in 
accordance with principle, not policy.  Dworkin argues that this better describes actual 
judicial practice than either any plain-fact view of law or any view that says that policy 
guides judges.  Furthermore, he says that law as integrity is better morally.  Both of these 
points are at the core of law as integrity, which I will discuss below. 
 
A. Law as Integrity 
 As I mentioned earlier, Dworkin sets out to prove that his conception of law is a 
normative one; it is morally and politically the best one, and in order to do this he 
addresses two other conceptions of law.  In this section I will sketch his arguments 
against conventionalism, and then proceed to his argument for law as integrity.  I will 
leave out Hart’s replies to Dworkin’s criticisms until later, as these will prove interesting 
in my analysis of international law. 
 In order to analyze these rival conceptions of law, Dworkin begins his analysis of 
“interpretive concepts”.55  He writes that all interpretation, whether literary, artistic, or 
scientific, is normative and “strives to make an object the best it can be, as an instance of 
some assumed enterprise, and that interpretation take different forms in different contexts 
only because different enterprises engage different standards of value or success”.56  
Dworkin addresses the objection that this view of interpretation is absurd, particularly in 
reference to artistic interpretation, because artistic interpretation is like conversational 
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interpretation of an author.  What matters, if that view of interpretation is correct, is not 
that the judgment or item in question is the best that it can be (which would reflect from 
the interpreter), but rather the actual, historical intention of the authors.57  
 Dworkin argues against this by showing that even when one tries to discover an 
artist’s actual intention, inquiry into intention shades into normative construction.  Say, as 
Dworkin does,58 in the treatment of a film, the director notices that there is a particular 
portion which could have a reference to a known legend at the time of the film.  The 
original filmmaker is dead, but the reference made explicit in the director’s interpretation 
would certainly make the film better, and it is not absurd that the reference would have 
been intended by the original director anyway if he or she had considered it.  
Furthermore, this reference may actually help the original director discover part of the 
meaning of his work, which is more than simply trying to find his intentions.  This small 
example shows how Dworkin argues against even artistic interpretation as being only 
about original intention, and not about the work being the best that it can be.  When 
determining how to make a work the best it can be, the interpreter must take into account 
intention, but also other principles which improve it aesthetically. 
 When we interpret something, writes Dworkin, we have three stages of 
interpretation that must be met along with different levels of consensus within a given 
community for interpretation59 to succeed.  There must first be a “preinterpretive” stage, 
in which the rules and principles providing the content of the practice are identified.60  
This is like identifying the text of say, The Merchant of Venice, as distinguished from the 
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texts of other plays.  Dworkin maintains here that some amount of interpretation is 
necessary at this stage as well; the community must agree to recognize The Merchant of 
Venice as what it is, and so some consensus must be reached. Next, there is an 
interpretive stage “at which the interpreter settles on some general justification for the 
main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive stage”.61  This stage will 
consist of reasoning for why the practice is worth pursuing, if it turns out to be so, and it 
must fit the practice well enough that the interpreter can justify his interpretation without 
inventing a new practice altogether.  Finally, there is a postinterpretive or reforming 
stage,62 in which the interpreter reforms his or her ideas as to what the practice requires 
so as to serve the justification he or she gave in the interpretive stage.   
 Dworkin argues that this structure of interpretation is integral to the judicial 
process, and that “law is an interpretive concept”.63  Furthermore, the purpose of law, 
according to Dworkin, is to justify coercion, because law claims to create obligations, not 
mere threats.  Hart claims that law does not exist to justify coercion, but Dworkin (and 
other natural law theorists) take issue with this and claim that Hart’s theory does not 
comprehend the full consequences of insisting that obligation is a normative concept.  
Without justification, obligations simply become threats.  Thus each concept of law he 
evaluates, including law as integrity, must have an answer for why coercion is justified, 
or else the law is simply a method of threatening people to do something, rather than 
creating real, effective, and most importantly, justified obligations. 
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 Following this explanation of the interpretive stages, he gives his argument 
against conventionalism. Dworkin argues that a conception of legal interpretation must 
answer three questions.  They are as follows: “First, is the supposed link between law and 
coercion justified at all? Is there any point to requiring public force to be used only in 
ways conforming to rights and responsibilities that “flow from” past political decisions? 
Second, if there is such a point, what is it? Third, what reading of “flow from” - what 
notion of consistency with past decisions - best serves it?”64  Conventionalism, Dworkin 
writes, gives a definitive answer to the first question, by accepting law and legal rights.65   
It responds to the second question by saying that “the point of law’s constraint, our 
reason for requiring that force be used only in ways consistent with past political 
decisions, is exhausted by the predictability and procedural fairness this constraint 
supplies…”.66  Finally, conventionalism addresses the third question by stating that these 
rights and responsibilities can flow from past decisions only when these rights are made 
explicit through them (as in, through the black letter of the law) or through some accepted 
legal practice as a whole. 
 Conventionalism is the theory that “the law is the law. It is not what judges think 
it is, but what it really is.  Their job is to apply it, not to change it to fit their own ethics or 
politics67”.  Conventionalism follows the “plain-fact” view of law introduced earlier, and 
adheres to value-neutral fact in deciding cases.  Since a proper conception of law, as 
Dworkin writes, is about the justification for the use of force,68 he argues that 
                                                 
64 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 94. 
65 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 95. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 114. 
68 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 109. 
  41 
conventionalism as a conception says that collective force should not be used on an 
individual or group without some past political decision that explicitly (with no room for 
disagreement among competent lawyers and judges) gives license for that force.  
Conventionalism asserts that every legal system has conventions that describe what the 
law really is, and how judges are to make decisions based on that fact.  Conventions 
should be easily identifiable practices that give clear guidance. 
 An important aspect of conventionalism is that it denies that the law is complete 
and there is an answer for every legal issue.  In fact, Dworkin describes it as 
“discretionary in the strong sense”,69 since judges are required to look beyond the law to 
justify the decision they make in a controversial case when convention runs out.  
Discretion in the strong sense means that judges are not bound by any authority or any 
one decision, because the law has run out; they are allowed to choose any decision that 
they choose at the time.  Dworkin, in contrast, insists that legal principles are moral 
standards that articulate rights that are not merely conventional.  Yet, to be legal 
principles, these principles must fit the body of black-letter law well.  Dworkin argues 
against this type of strong discretion, and argues that his judge (as we will see later) uses 
weak discretion to interpret (rather than invent) the law when he or she makes a 
controversial decision about what principle best fits the existing body of law (legal 
decisions and principles). 
 Dworkin says that conventionalism, like his law of integrity, aims to show what 
judges do in the best light possible and best explain the legal practice.  In order to do so, 
conventionalism makes two postinterpretive claims.70  The first is that judges must 
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respect the established legal conventions in their communities except on very rare 
occasions.  The second is that there is no law (or right flowing from past political 
decisions)71 besides the law drawn from past political decisions and conventions of the 
legal community, and so in those occasions mentioned above there really is no law either 
way.  In McLoughlin, for example, no past judge had granted emotional damages to a 
loved one who came to the scene hours later, thus there was no law in the situation.  The 
judge had to rely on those extralegal standards we mentioned a moment ago to decide the 
case, and after doing so the case would become precedent and become a convention.   
 An important note to understand about Dworkin’s conceptions of law: these 
conceptions do not claim that all lawyers and judges adhere to any given conception, nor 
do they claim that every decision made adheres to them.  Instead, any of these 
conceptions (e.g. conventionalism) counts judgments that violate conventionalism as 
mistakes, but asserts that enough decisions are made and enough behavior from judges 
exhibits to make it the true, prevailing conception of law.  Therefore Dworkin’s point is 
to show that enough of the legal practice does not conform to that particular legal 
conception as to undermine its credibility.   
 Conventionalism starts, then, on a positive note: almost everyone understands the 
concept of precedent and past judicial decision as being a driving force of established law 
and future legal decisions.  However, conventionalism orders judges to look at past, 
established conventions for their sources of law, and oftentimes judges disagree as to 
what the law really requires in that instance.72  In the Elmer case, for example, the judges 
did not disagree about what statutes applied to the case, but about what the statute really 
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said, because they held different theories of statutory interpretation.  The majority 
opinion of the court decided that it was not right for Elmer to inherit according to 
“established principles of justice”.   It is here, Dworkin asserts, that judges must interpret 
past law using moral principles and not just interpret what the law is from conventions, 
and there conventionalism falls apart.  This “soft” form of conventionalism is different 
from strict conventionalism, since strict conventionalism asserts that there is no authority 
for legal decisions beyond uncontroversial conventional understandings of past legal 
decisions.  There is no room in strict conventionalism for interpretation at all.  The 
problem arises when judges cannot decide what past legal decisions dictate in a particular 
case.  Thus, judges must interpret the law in some way, which leads away from the 
“plain-fact” conventional interpretation, reverts to normative considerations (e.g. 
reasonable intent), and soon this interpretation becomes “soft conventionalism".  
Dworkin finally concludes that “soft conventionalism”73 is really just an underdeveloped 
form of law as integrity, because it interprets by other standards than conventions - moral 
standards. 
 This form of soft conventionalism, or as I shall hereafter refer to it, 
conventionalism is different from law as integrity in certain distinct ways.  
Conventionalism “rejects consistency in principle [i.e. moral principle] as a source of 
legal rights”.74  Law as integrity asserts that there must be consistency in principle, not 
just in strategy, in adjudication,75 and claims that there must be a stronger consistency in 
principle than consistency in legal conventions (statutes and existing legal practices, for 
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example).  Consistency in strategy is consistency to achieve some goal other than the 
enforcement of existing legal rights or duties, such as maintaining predictable 
conventions.  Conventionalism does not take principle into account when deciding cases; 
instead, it strives to decide cases based on consistency in strategy.  Dworkin makes the 
claim here, in fact, that anyone who accepts that stronger consistency in principle is the 
right thing to do has already rejected conventionalism.  Conventionalism cannot accept 
consistency in principle over consistency in strategy.   
 Law as integrity, on the other hand, claims that people are entitled to consistency 
in principle of past political and legal decisions.  Law as integrity “insists that the law - 
the rights and duties that flow from past collective decisions and for that reason 
license…coercion - contains not only the narrow explicit content of these decisions but 
also…the scheme of principles necessary to justify them”.76  Law as integrity, 
furthermore, claims that the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process 
have a definite place in judges’ decisions, and that a consistency in these principles is 
necessary to discern what the law is.  It strives to make the law the best it can be by 
asserting that “present practice [the law] can be organized by and justified in principles 
sufficiently attractive to provide an honorable future”.77  This concept of an honorable 
future will come into play in our discussion of Dworkin’s view of international law.  Law 
as integrity says that in both legislation and adjudication, those responsible have a duty to 
create laws, enforce laws, and decide what the law is in a coherent way, as understood by 
law as integrity.  The judge’s task in a case is to determine the existing legal rights and 
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duties of the parties before him or her in a hard case by reference to the most attractive 
moral principle that fits the relevant precedents or statutes.   
 In McLoughlin, for example, Dworkin uses his “perfect judge” Hercules, who 
operates under law as integrity, to apply six moral and legal principles to the case.  
Hercules considers these possible principles that would explain and justify the court’s 
decision, ultimately ruling three out on the fact that they do not interpret the legal 
decision to be the best it can be because they employ an arbitrary principle (such as 
“‘People have a right to compensation for emotional injury suffered at the scene of an 
accident against anyone whose carelessness caused the accident but have no right to 
compensation for emotional injury later’”)78 or are pragmatic, i.e. the fate of the parties in 
the case is at the mercy of a court’s policy preferences.  Hercules evaluates the next three, 
and asserts that “law as integrity…requires a judge to test his [or her] interpretation of 
any part of the great network of political structures and decisions of his [or her] 
community by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the 
network as a whole”.79  While Dworkin concedes that no one judge can evaluate the 
entire legal practice at once, the judge can in a limited fashion evaluate how his or her 
decision fits in with the larger scope of the legal practice, and evaluate whether it helps 
make the practice justified in the best way it can be. Dworkin writes that Hercules has 
infinite time and wisdom, and can therefore do this to the fullest capacity.  Hercules 
therefore chooses the legal principle which best fits in with past legal decisions and the 
legal practice as a whole, and helps to make the legal practice the best it can be.  
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Choosing this principle means choosing to abide by integrity (consistency in principle) 
over the other three dominant principles (see below). 
 Dworkin writes that in a perfect world, integrity would not need to be set apart as 
a separate virtue from these other principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due 
process.  In a utopian society, consistency in principle would be guaranteed, because the 
officials would always do what is just and fair.80  In our society, however, we must 
recognize that sometimes a judge may decide for justice over fairness or fairness over 
justice.  “Fairness in politics [for example] is a matter of finding political procedures - 
methods of electing officials and making their decisions responsive to the electorate - that 
distribute political power the right way,”81 writes Dworkin, while “justice [in politics], on 
the contrary, is concerned with the decisions that the standing political institutions, 
whether or not they have been chosen fairly, ought to make”, regardless of popular 
opinion.82  So the principles of fairness and justice can be distinguished as an official 
acting under the former would strive to be fair in power and the politically moral wishes 
of the electorate, while an elected official under the latter would strive to make the 
correct decisions for the best “morally defensible”83 outcome for the community. 
 Strict conventionalism, as we have seen, makes fairness of a sort - conforming to 
popular expectation - its first priority, and disregards individual rights or circumstances, 
since conventionalists would strive for fair, equal treatment of everyone regardless of 
circumstance or some individual right.  One form of pragmatism, on the opposite end of 
the spectrum, values justice over fairness, and declares that judges have the ultimate 
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strong discretion.  For these pragmatists, judges are merely policymakers in robes.  
Judges can choose whatever they like, since pragmatists deny that there is really law at 
all, as long as their decisions make the future community the best it can be.  Furthermore, 
legal pragmatists, according to Dworkin, pretend that there is law in order to advance 
their claims of justice, and in order to make the best outcome for the community possible 
for the future.  But there is no reason that black letter law must be respected when 
adjudicating; rather, these pragmatists assert that whatever outcome is best for the 
community in general (thus disregarding individual legal rights by holding justice, or 
whatever the judge considers the best outcome, above those rights) should be law.   
 Law as integrity strives to make consistency in principle (not policy) reign.  
Parties in a case come to discover what their individual rights and duties were when the 
contested acts took place, rather than judges making ex post facto law.   
 Law as integrity relies on the concept of the community personified in order to 
recognize that the community as a moral agent is behind the concept of integrity.  For 
Dworkin, the best moral principle might not fit the black-letter law well enough to count 
as a legal principle of the legal system.  That is why integrity matters; the judge applies 
the best principle that fits the black-letter law.  Dworkin uses the concept of a chain 
novel84 to illustrate these ideas: many authors write the chain novel, and each writes his 
or her chapter constrained by the chapters he or she is handed, in accordance with the 
general outlines of plot, character development, and genuine aesthetic and literary merit.  
Dworkin argues that this manner of adjudication is not only morally best, but most 
accurately reflects the nature of the accepted legal practice.  The best interpretation of the 
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legal practice should reflect the right answer to the question, “What does the law require 
in this case?”   
 His response is that law as integrity gives us the best answer (through past legal 
decisions and moral principles), far better than conventionalism or pragmatism.  The 
author in this situation would be interpreting the law and applying the decision that best 
fits in with the existing body of law, rather than inventing law, as would take place in 
both conventionalism and pragmatism if pushed to their extremes.  Strict conventionalists 
must interpret eventually, and would still attempt to choose a decision based on 
consistency in policy.  Dworkin asserts that pragmatist judges invent law constantly, and 
decide what the law is based on the outcome for the community as a whole.  A judge 
operating under law as integrity, by contrast, takes into account the existing legal practice 
and attempts to interpret (not invent) the law to make a decision based on the most 
attractive moral principle, in order to determine what the rights and duties of the parties 
were and are in that case. 
 The next question, then, is as follows: does law as integrity connect with 
Dworkin’s argument that a true conception of law justifies coercion?  Dworkin argues 
that citizens do have genuine obligations under the law, for the simple reason that “no 
general policy of upholding the law with steel [coercing] could be justified if the law 
were not, in general, a source of genuine obligations”.85  He argues that these obligations 
are decidedly moral ones, because they are obligations that a citizen has a moral duty to 
perform.  Dworkin argues that a state that recognizes law as integrity has a much better 
case for legitimacy than one that does not.86  In systems which do not justify coercion 
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(such as truly evil systems like the Nazi government), no decent principle fits into the 
black-letter law, and thus these systems should be understood as degenerate cases of law, 
by reference to the conceptually central as well as morally superior systems that are 
united by attractive moral principles.  Under these systems, citizens do not have moral 
obligations under the law.  Yet even Nazi law pretends to create genuine obligations, not 
just mere threats.  Even that legal system claims legitimacy, which suggests that the 
central case of law is one that really does create obligations. 
 In morally superior systems - which are conceptually central - Dworkin argues for 
genuine communal obligations.87  He writes that within a group, the members of the 
group must regard the group’s obligations as: special, meaning that they have certain 
obligations to the other members that are not owed outside of it; personal, that these 
obligations run from person to person and not just to the group as a whole; genuine 
concern for one another’s well-being; and finally equal, so that each individual member 
has and is aware of equal obligations toward each individual member.  These criteria are 
representative of a community that Dworkin calls a “true community”.88  Dworkin asserts 
that this true community - where members are obligated to have these four traits - best 
legitimizes a legal system. 
 From this form of true community which recognizes true obligations for each 
individual member to each individual member, and thus is an equal and recognizably 
principled community, Dworkin writes that we arrive at the principle of integrity.  This is 
so because the community is founded on principles and so strives to uphold these 
principles, and chief among them is the principle of integrity.  This principle of integrity 
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upholds the consistency of principle the community supports, and the community treats 
integrity in politics as an integral part of their successful community.89  So then, how 
does integrity function in law? 
 In deciding cases (which is Dworkin’s chief concern), law as integrity instructs 
judges to “identify legal rights and duties…on the assumption that they were all created 
by a single author - the community personified - expressing a coherent conception of 
justice and fairness”.90  Integrity in principle, where cases are decided according to a 
uniformity in principle and strict adherence to individual rights over either strict 
conventionalism or pragmatism, is in Dworkin’s view most representative of our legal 
system.  “According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or 
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the 
best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice”;91 it is clear that law as 
integrity is a unique conception of law, and is certainly different from Hart’s law as 
primary and secondary rules.   
 Under Hart’s theory law consists of rules, while Dworkin’s theory asserts that 
legal rules are united by principles.  In Dworkin’s “The Model of Rules”,92 he sets out his 
distinction between legal rules and legal principles.  Legal rules exist and are a major part 
of both Dworkin and Hart’s legal conceptions.  A rule would be something like, “No cars 
may park in this designated area,” while a principle would be, “People have a moral 
obligation to obey traffic and street ordinances”.  Yet Dworkin asserts that rules apply in 
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an “all or nothing fashion”,93 meaning that there is less flexibility for individual rights 
and circumstantial decisions, whereas principles have weight (they can apply in a case yet 
not prevail) in a way that rules do not (if a rule is applied, it will prevail) and compete 
against each other, and the judge should take care to apply the best principle for the case.   
In this way principles act like moral reasons.  Furthermore, principles unify rules; they 
keep rules from being disjointed, atomic statements, such as the principle “people have a 
right to privacy”, which would unify various precedents or constitutional provisions.  As 
seen earlier, Hercules picks the best and most attractive principle that applies to that case 
in order that the case can best fit the legal practice and be the best that it can be.  
 Integrity that comes from the community personified allows judges to decide 
from commonly accepted moral principles, while also paying close attention to past legal 
decisions.  Dworkin argues that this is what makes law as integrity so representative of 
our own legal practice: in it judges pay attention to legal history, but understand it in light 
of moral principles.  “Law as integrity”, claims Dworkin, “is both the product of and the 
inspiration for comprehensive interpretation of legal practice”.94  A common law judge 
operating under law as integrity pays attention to history in that he or she examines the 
history of the legal practice as expressed by the community personified, and then decides 
a case in the way that best justifies past judicial decisions in terms of principles of justice.   
  
B. Right Answer Thesis 
 One of the best objections to Dworkin’s arguments is undoubtedly that different 
judges will have strikingly different answers to questions about which principles best fit 
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the law.  There are many instances in which many principles might fit a given case.  
Why, any reasonable person may inquire, does this form of adjudication make any 
practical sense?  If all judges decide according to differing moral principles, will not 
almost every decision made be different from one another?  Each judge could decide on a 
different moral basis, and this would result in conflicting legal decisions and practices. 
Even if these decisions are somehow not drastically different, how can they be said to be 
properly justified, or right in the moral or correct sense?  Furthermore, are there 
objectively true principles at all?  Dworkin states the objection thus:  
 Hard cases are hard because different sets of principles fit past decisions well  
 enough to count as eligible interpretations of them.  Lawyers and judges will  
 disagree about which of two is fairer or more just, all things considered, but  
 neither side can be ‘really’ right because there are no objective standards of  
 fairness and justice a neutral observer could use to decide between them.  So law  
 as integrity ends in the result that there is really no law at all in hard cases….95 
 Dworkin’s answer to this objection is perhaps even more interesting than his 
original legal conception.  In Law’s Empire and also in his Objectivity and Truth: You’d 
Better Believe It, Dworkin argues that there is a right answer in virtually every case.  This 
is so, according to his theory, because an ideal judge (Hercules), given enough time, can 
potentially come to the objectively right conclusion.  But again, why think that there are 
objectively right answers to hard normative questions? 
 Dworkin distinguishes external from internal skepticism in Chapter 2 of Law’s 
Empire, where external skepticism can be understood as being outside a practice, whether 
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it be law, morality, or otherwise, as a whole and judges that nothing external to the 
practice (like metaphysical principles of justice that are “part of the fabric of the 
universe”) objectively grounds it.  Internal skepticism, on the other hand, applies the 
standards of the practice and says that the practice cannot yield right answers.  External 
skepticism is not an interpretive or moral position, but is rather a metaphysical theory96 
asserting that there are no fundamental moral principles out there in the universe that can 
be proven, and thus there is no reason to believe in objective moral truth.  Dworkin 
rejects external skepticism because it is irrelevant to the discussion of interpretation and 
hard cases; it is outside interpretation and yet claims that no interpretation can be correct.  
Dworkin asserts that external skepticism’s point, that there are no tangible moral 
principles out in the universe, is nonsensical.  We can make no sense of the difference 
between making a moral argument that “slavery is unjust” and its being really unjust in 
virtue of some metaphysical claim about justice.97 He further asserts there are in fact 
ways to interpret cases and other things that the discussion of external skepticism has no 
hope of truly challenging.98  External skepticism is completely outside of the practice of 
interpretation, and so evaluating claims of principle by external skepticism is, to 
Dworkin, an absurd and nonsensical claim. 
 Instead, Dworkin finds the arguments of internal skepticism much more pressing 
for this issue of right answers in cases, because it attacks integrity at its core.  He 
addresses a type of argument from internal skepticism where his opponent asserts, 
“…legal practice is too deeply contradictory to yield any coherent interpretation at all”.99  
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While Dworkin understands that the law is often far from consistent in matters of 
principle, he still believes that the contradictions inherent in some areas of law are not so 
complete as to render the question of right answers a contradictory or hopeless one, i.e. 
McLoughlin.  In fact, Dworkin makes the claim that when we make moral judgements 
like “Genocide is wrong” or “Slavery is evil”, these are not subjective opinions because 
they make sense of many particular moral judgments.  This can be applied to hard 
judicial decisions, which employ the most attractive principles that fit the legal corpus.  If 
pressed, writes Dworkin, his theory must claim that those moral opinions are true, and 
that this has powerful consequences.100  One of these consequences, of course, is that 
there is one right answer that can be reached if the legal case in question is interpreted 
properly.   
 This is partly a response to a question he asks in A Matter of Principle: “Shall we 
say that the judge must look for the right answer to the question of [whether the contract 
in question was valid], even though the community is deeply divided about what the right 
answer is? Or is it more realistic to say that there simply is no right answer?”.101  This 
does not mean that everyone who interprets the law will reach the same answer, or if they 
did that it would be justified by the same reasoning.  Rather, it means that if a perfect 
judge applied himself or herself for an undetermined but perfect amount of time, he or 
she would reach the correct interpretation, and thus the correct answer.  This position 
accurately portrays Dworkin’s startling belief that there is a correct interpretive answer to 
virtually every legal question, and given enough time a judge could always reach that 
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decision.  This conclusion lends itself to three central findings: 1) that the practice of 
adjudication presupposes that the judge is looking for a right answer (and Dworkin’s 
theory has an answer for what that is), 2) that external skepticism is toothless (or 
nonsensical), and 3) that we can at least in some cases plausibly claim to make a decision 
required of us by the task of putting legal history in its best light.  In the next section I 
will discuss Hart’s response to Dworkin’s claims against positivism, which in some 
important ways is grouped with conventionalism. 
 
C. Response to Hart 
 A large part of Dworkin’s influence comes from his critique of legal positivism, 
and in particular, of Hart’s version of it.  Popularly called the “Hart-Dworkin” debate, 
their rival conceptions of law have inspired numerous essays and books.  Because this 
debate has been contested throughout many arenas and many times over, I will not claim 
to give a precise and comprehensive view of the debate; rather, I will try to address 
certain points at which they diverge in order to show how their legal conceptions differ in 
ways relevant to this paper.  In this section, then, I will attempt to show how Hart replies 
to Dworkin’s critique and the various problems with his reply in defense of positivism.  
 First off, I must remind the reader about the three main questions a conception of 
law must answer in Dworkin’s thinking.102  Dworkin claims here that a conception of law 
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must answer the three main “interpretive” questions reviewed earlier to properly address 
the legal practice.  Dworkin also writes that it is necessary, in order to provide 
justification for a legal system’s use of force, to be an “insider” in that system,103 which I 
will address shortly.  He objects to Hart’s theory, saying that it is purely descriptive and 
that Hart is wrong in asserting that his theory adequately accounts for law’s normativity, 
including the “internal aspect” of rules, better than Austin. Dworkin strongly objects to 
Hart’s claim that he finds a balance between Austin’s command model and natural law 
theory, and that he adequately accounts for normativity. 
 Hart replies, in his highly anticipated and posthumous reply to Dworkin in his 
second edition of The Concept of Law, that his account of law is both “general” and 
“descriptive”, and therefore he does not try to justify the use of coercion or force.  Rather, 
he gives a general descriptive account of law and legal practice.104  Hart portrays 
Dworkin as viewing this kind of account as “meaningless and useless”,105 and I think that 
Dworkin agrees with this portrayal.  Dworkin asserts that one cannot give an adequate 
account of the nature of law and obligation without interpreting law from an insider 
(someone who accepts the laws as legal duties and obligations) standpoint.  Hart rejects 
this. He replies that “there is nothing in the project of a descriptive jurisprudence…to 
preclude a non-participant external observer from describing the ways in which 
participants view the law from such an internal point of view”.106 
 However, there is certainly a point at which the descriptive legal theorist cannot 
go further in giving a full and accurate account of why the internal participants view the 
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law the way they do, and for what purpose.  The question of how these participants view 
and identify the law (or with what institutions or attitudes they view and identify it) may 
be answered easily enough; it may make reference to coercion and legislative bodies and 
constitutions. Yet it cannot fully explain why the law functions as it does, or why judges 
should decide cases on certain criteria.  If Hart truly seeks to give some account of the 
normativity of law (which is his issue with Austin), how does his conception of law do 
this?  Law by its nature claims to create genuine obligations; both theorists assert that 
point.  Does Hart’s purely descriptive account of law make that clear, or even possible?  
It seems to me that genuine obligations must be understood through some normative 
viewpoint, and a commitment to being inside that system and evaluating it from that 
standpoint.  A purely descriptive analysis of law cannot reach a full understanding of the 
normative enterprise of a legal system that creates genuine obligations.  This relates to 
Hart's theory of international law, because he says that international law is a less 
developed form of law because it cannot enforce its standards and lacks a rule of 
recognition.  Hart must use normative considerations to explain how international law 
does or does not resemble a fully developed legal system, and since he does not, his 
theory cannot accomplish what it attempts to do. 
 Furthermore, Hart’s theory does not elucidate law as a system, which is what 
Dworkin is so strongly urging that a legal conception must do.  Hart may again urge that 
a descriptive, general theory does not need to defend or justify law, and indeed is not 
trying to do so, but I feel then that I must side with Dworkin. If Hart continues to remain 
outside of the legal framework as a descriptive observer, his theory eventually turns into 
observations that, though they describe the legal practice, cannot fully understand it.  
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Dworkin asserts that Hart’s observer cannot fully understand the nature of law because it 
does not grasp its normative demands on its subjects.  This understanding of normativity 
requires reference to a system that actually generates obligations and rights by being 
grounded in sound moral principle. Law is an essentially normative enterprise; it tells us 
what we should or should not do, and what we can and cannot do if we so desire.  Hart’s 
method of remaining above this enterprise serves to make his theory non-normative, and 
so goes against his claim to capture the normativity of law. 
 Dworkin rejects Hart’s positivism partly because he claims that Hart “insists that 
law and morals are made wholly distinct by semantic rules everyone accepts for using 
‘law’”.107  Furthermore, in Dworkin’s view Hart (and his predecessor, Austin) says that 
propositions of law are matters of social fact and thus they make no claim about what the 
law should do or ought to do.  Dworkin insists as well that grounds of law - those 
considerations that determine what the law is - are controversial in ways that exclude 
mere linguistic analysis.  They are contested partly on moral grounds.  
 Hart replies that his arguments are not about some semantic understanding of the 
word ‘law’, but instead advance the description about what goes on in a legal system, 
including primary and secondary rules and a rule of recognition.  Hart rejects Dworkin’s 
criticism that Hart’s legal conception does not give adequate justification for the use of 
force in a legal system.  This, Hart replies, was never one of his aims in his descriptive 
conception, and indeed he writes, “It certainly is not and never has been my view that law 
has this as its point or purpose”.108  Hart writes that like other positivists his theory does 
not try to identify or explain the point of law and legal practices, and he further 
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elaborates, “I think it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as such 
serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such 
conduct”.109  While it claims that the rules are normative, the theory itself is not 
normative.  Hart’s theory is an essentially non-normative theory that makes non-
normative claims about normative legal rules, in a normative legal system.  Hart claims 
that he has remedied Austin’s purely predictive, empirical analysis of obligation with his 
normative primary and secondary rules. 
 Hart therefore makes no claim to when (if ever) the law is justified at all; he 
merely describes the fundamental features of a mature legal system. Dworkin’s claim that 
one of the key tenets of law is to provide justification for coercion is therefore irrelevant 
to Hart’s theory, apparently, which is only to describe law and legal systems and to 
identify certain important components of these social phenomena.  Coercion, according 
to Hart, serves a sort of secondary function where its purpose is to remedy the situations 
in which its primary function of guiding human behavior has failed.  Hart writes, 
therefore, that justifying coercion cannot be its main point or purpose. Yet when a system 
is using coercion without any obvious justification, Hart’s theory falls short in that it 
cannot account for e.g. international law maintaining authority over some states without 
their consent.  I will address this point later on in this paper. 
 Finally, returning to the issue of morality, Hart replies to Dworkin’s conception of 
law by stating that the greatest difference between their theories is how they identify the 
law.  This particular line of argument will be most illuminating as we proceed to the next 
section on actual international law.  Hart writes that according to his theory, the law can 
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be identified by referencing the existing social sources of law, among which are the 
legislation, judicial decisions, social customs, and statutes prevalent in a given legal 
system110, through a rule of recognition.  This theory does not reference morality except 
where the law has incorporated some moral principle as part of the law itself.  Dworkin’s 
theory on the other hand, Hart claims, purports that: 
  Every proposition of law…necessarily involves a moral judgment, since   
 according to his holistic interpretive theory propositions of law are true only if  
 with other premises they follow from that set of principles which both fit all the  
 settled law identified by reference to the social sources of the law and provide the  
 best moral justification for it”.111 
 So Dworkin’s theory, Hart writes, serves to identify the law and to provide some 
moral justification for it.  Even if the legal system is seemingly evil, we can claim that 
that legal system is law in the preinterpretive sense.  Hart claims that this is merely 
changing the language to fit Dworkin’s theory, and that a positivist could find some other 
reasons for describing the Nazi system as law, for instance, because except for morality it 
contained all of the relevant features generally found in legal systems.  He maintains that 
Dworkin’s theory tries to find a reason why a morally iniquitous system is still a legal 
system even though it is morally flawed.  As we shall see in the next section, both seem 
to come to the idea that international law is some form of underdeveloped law fairly 
quickly, but the manner at which they reach this conclusion is markedly different. 
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IV. Analysis of International Law 
 
 At this point in this project I have covered the both of the legal conceptions of 
H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, in order to evaluate from each perspective whether 
international law is law at all, and, if so, how and to what extent. It is my position that 
international law, while not fully developed as is a mature municipal system, is not mere 
moral custom, but instead is a set of binding international legal rules.  These rules are 
better explained, justified, and united, however, through principles.  In the section on 
Hart, the writer covered international law so well that I think that his opinions on how his 
conception of law relates to international law are best left in that section, and I will 
reference his arguments rather than summarizing them again here.  Remember how I 
addressed the concern that Hart’s theory does not address the bulk of international law 
which concerns the enforcing of decidedly moral principles against cruelty and human 
rights.  It seems that his theory, in accepting these as established rules of international 
law, accepts that some things are illegal under international law because they are wrong 
in some moral sense.  This comes perilously close to his theory being (as Dworkin 
asserts) an underdeveloped form of law as integrity, because he seems to think certain 
norms of international law are law because of their moral quality rather than a rule of 
recognition identifying them as such.  Remember that he allows that there is no rule of 
recognition in international law.  So Dworkin’s theory on law becomes more relevant in 
the discussion of international law, as his theory says that there is no hard and fast 
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distinction between legal and moral principle, and that moral principles often figure in 
determining what the law is. 
 I will begin with the discussion of the sources of international law as outlined by 
Article 38 (1) and (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  Throughout this 
discussion I will use Dworkin’s theory to examine whether international law is law 
proper, and how and to what extent international law can be conceived as law at all.  
These articles in the statute aid Dworkin’s argument in considerable ways, as I will show 
shortly. 
 Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice gives the sources 
of international law succinctly, though there is always room for interpretation of these 
statutes.  It reads:  
 The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such  
 disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.112 
 These four sources of international law declare what the international law is in 
regards to any case or decision.  Article 38 (2) though, gives an interesting addendum to 
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Article 38 (1): “This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case 
ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto”,113 which is the stipulation that gives the 
Court the right to decide a case according to what is “right and fair”, as long as the 
parties (or states) agree to it.  This addendum is interesting because it addresses the issue 
of state agreement and consensus, which Dworkin argues cannot be the true justification 
for international law’s force in the following pages.  Following this quick glance at the 
sources of international law, I will now address Dworkin’s claims in regards to 
international law and how these claims relate to these statutes. 
 
A. Dworkin on International Law 
 Hart gave perhaps more attention to the issue of international law than anyone in 
his time.  He devotes an entire chapter of his book The Concept of Law to the evaluation 
of international law and the objections made against it.  In Hart’s view, as we saw above, 
international law is clearly law, but it seems to lack some important aspects such as 
legislation, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and sanctions.  So while we easily reach 
the point that international law is law according to Hart’s positivism, we reach a point 
where Hart’s theory asserts that international law is an underdeveloped form of law.  
International law lacks certain aspects in form (a rule of recognition, an international 
police force, etc.) that prohibits it from being completely developed. 
 Is a similar obstacle present in Dworkin’s theory?  He writes that people really 
doubted if international law was law at all when positivism was more popular.  They 
(including Hart) unfavorably compared the rules of international law with those of 
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municipal law.  Since Dworkin asserts that principles, and not some rule of recognition, 
unite a legal system, his theory does not depend on finding one in international law.  His 
theory instead focuses on the justification of coercion, and so he must explain how force 
is justified in international law.  In more recent years, Dworkin writes, there is no longer 
a question of whether international law is law; it is commonly accepted that it is.  The 
real question, which is the question we are wondering in this particular scholarship, is 
why international law is accepted as law, and to what extent it qualifies?  
 Dworkin writes that modern legal positivists declare that the above Articles are 
the closest thing to a “rule of recognition”.  Indeed, one of the reasons I cited these 
Articles was to recognize that this is the most widely accepted view of the sources of 
international law available, and undoubtedly those looking for a Hartian rule of 
recognition would look there for their rule.  While this is acceptable to an extent, it really 
cannot count as one, because these Articles themselves would have to be declared valid 
by a rule of recognition, if there were such a rule.  While this is a candidate for a rule of 
recognition, it does not seem to fit. While modern international law does indeed cite 
certain ius cogens or “peremptory norms”114 as established standards, most tenets of 
international law still refer to these norms as requiring consent of the states and parties 
working with them, which would be different from a well-established (and therefore 
universally accepted) rule of recognition.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
stipulates this exact fact: 
 For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general  
 international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international   
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 community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted  
 and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international  
 law having the same character.115 
 These norms so cited as a rule of recognition, then, still stipulate that the states 
must agree and recognize these norms as accepted in this form of law.  As Hart has noted, 
though, his theory is descriptive of most developed and sophisticated legal systems, and 
does not claim that a system cannot be law at all without certain components like the rule 
of recognition. This takes us back to Hart’s general conclusion that international law is an 
underdeveloped or more primitive form of law than municipal law.  International law 
seems to be, in Hart’s theory, less of a legal system and more of a collection of states 
agreeing to a set of rules that stipulate certain standards of behavior and punishment if 
they breach these standards.  This agreement of states seems to make the set of rules less 
like Hart’s idea of law (non-moral criteria identified by a rule of recognition), and more 
akin to customary morality that is inherently part of law.  I will ask the question of 
whether Hart can account for this morality shortly.  This agreement of states seems 
reminiscent of an aspect of Dworkin’s theory, though, but with a twist: Dworkin’s theory 
has the potential to save international law from being merely a collection of states 
agreeing to these rules by uniting these rules with principles, and these principles can 
account for the normative aspects of law better than Hart’s theory. 
 The aspect I am referring to in Dworkin’s theory is his concept of a true 
community.  Remember that he emphasized that the community must agree to of these 
standards of law, must treat them as special standards that they would not agree to if they 
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were not in the community, personal standards that they accept for each member of the 
group, responsibilities to treat each other with genuine concern, and equal standards for 
each member of the group.  Is the international community representative of this true 
community? In some ways, I think so; in others, perhaps not.  Certainly in accepting 
treaties and standards of behavior these consenting states seem to regard these standards 
as special, else if one state broke the treaty there would not need to be action filed against 
that state.  The states are also generally accepted as equal, for the criteria for ratifying a 
treaty and accepting standards is accepting that all states will be equally worthy and be 
bound by the same responsibilities.  The genuine concern is perhaps lacking in this 
analogy, but later Dworkin shows how states do have an obligation to have a concern for 
one another.  This analogy in general is most illuminating in seeing how much this 
particular aspect of Dworkin’s theory gets us closer to recognizing international law as a 
justified legal system.   
 This is my goal, after all: reaching the best understanding of international law and 
recognizing which legal conception better illuminates its nature.  I agree with Dworkin 
that a legal system that gives norms of behavior must be justified, and so in my view his 
theory seems to take us closer to that justification.  Hart’s, on the other hand, seems to 
stop at the fact that international law is a primitive form of municipal law, or something 
like it, that suffers from certain defects in form.  This aspect of community helps us get 
closer to accounting for some of the more formal features of law (e.g. how customs can 
be law, independent of a rule of recognition) as well as justifying international law as an 
established legal system. 
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 The next problem to face is that international law does not limit itself to state-by-
state consent.116  This means that international law does not limit its rules to bind only 
those states that have consented to or ratified the statutes or treaties.  In the above statute, 
the International Court of Justice makes it clear that the “contesting states” can recognize 
the rules as being binding on them in whatever claim they bring forward.117  This matters 
because if they had already accepted these rules as a binding legal norm, they would not 
need to recognize them (another term for legally agreeing to it) when they bring the case 
to the court.  Yet international law claims to bind these states even if they do not already 
recognize these articles or statutes.  So it must be that not all states accept the statute as a 
binding, universal social norm, and instead shows that international law attempts to make 
its laws binding beyond those states which have explicitly agreed to its authority through 
treaties, customary law, and established conventions and statutes.  So there is a problem 
with international law’s authority, and the true obligatory nature of its laws; if these laws 
are not justified, binding laws creating genuine obligations, they can only count as law in 
a very limited sense, if at all. 
 So, Dworkin asks, how is this possible? And, more importantly, how can it be 
justified? By what justification should states accept as law that which they have not 
agreed to, or that which is not part of accepted customary law?  As I specified earlier, 
these are the most important questions to ask in regards to understanding and analyzing 
international law.  My view on this issue aligns with Dworkin’s; our conception of law, 
and by extension international law, must present a case for law’s justification; if not, the 
alternative is a purely descriptive account which cannot illuminate the binding force of 
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international law.  A system justified through Dworkin’s approach better explains how 
this system of international law can be a legal system without a rule of recognition to 
identify the law. Dworkin writes that Hartian positivists claim that states’ consent is what 
justifies international law, but Dworkin asserts that this is not sufficient.  If the 
justification for international law depends upon state-by-state consent, this argument 
cannot prevail.  As seen above, not all states supposedly bound by international law have 
consented to the treaties or conventions that bind them.  There must be another source of 
justification, and Dworkin aims to find it. 
 In order to answer this question of international law’s justification, Dworkin 
makes a reference to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which provides: “All 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.118  From this, he asks, 
what can we understand from the humanitarian intervention by NATO in Kosovo to stop 
genocide and other human atrocities?119  Did not NATO in this instance violate 
‘territorial integrity’ to invade Kosovo in order to halt the genocide?  The short and literal 
answer would be, ‘of course’, but this seems to lack an important component of the way 
in which we understand the right and wrong thing to do in the situation.  But clearly a 
body enforcing international law, such as the Court of International Justice, should not be 
able to do anything that it wants, even if they think that their actions or just or right, 
without justification.  So far, the consent argument has been applied to account for 
                                                 
118  Ronald Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law”, 8. 
119 For more information on this historical reference, follow the NATO link in the Reference 
page. 
  69 
international law’s justification, but it is fairly obvious that states would never give the 
ICJ, for example, the right to do whatever it wants under the consent argument alone.  
Even a positivist, protests Dworkin, who believes in strong discretion for judges, could 
not admit at this stage that they should have that much power on a global scale by 
justification through states’ consent to rules alone.120  Andrew McCarthy illustrates 
international law’s need for justification in his article,121 as he points out that under the 
Constitution, President Obama must get any treaty or international act approved by 
Congress before it is ratified under international law.  He points out that international law 
does not have the power to act on the President’s word alone, because this action by the 
international community would violate United States federal law if it accepted the 
President’s word without Congress’ agreement. McCarthy insists that in this unjustified 
view international law “is politics masquerading as a system governed by rules rather 
than power”,122 and thereby illustrates that as the rules currently stand under the consent 
argument, international law is not justified in enforcing any authority that has not already 
expressly been given by the sovereign states.  So there is a definite need a better case for 
the justification of international law, else it continues to be, as Mr. McCarthy asserts, 
“politics masquerading as a system governed by rules rather than power”.   
 Dworkin takes a very different approach to this, and returns to the question of 
justification shortly.  He asks first: if some mechanism were in place that could enforce 
international law, how would nations acknowledge it as justified, binding law? 
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 Dworkin asks: “what principle - what rule of recognition - do they supposedly 
follow in making that discrimination [nations decide for themselves whether some 
constraint they accept is imposed as a matter of law and not just decency]”?123  Perhaps 
they follow the principle that whatever other nations accept as law is law.  Ultimately, 
this will need further backing, because those other nations still need some basis to 
determine the law.  The process cannot continue ad infinitum; there must be some other 
explanation.  Customary law and treaties do not work well, either, because the 
representatives of states can change over time and their treaties that they ratified can 
conflict with their national beliefs or stances after a while.  This means, for example, that 
President Reagan could have ratified a treaty that the current citizens of the United States 
now oppose, and thus these treaties cannot give the basis for international law as an 
established set of rules and principles. Dworkin concludes earlier that state consent (state 
agreement to ratify treaties and statutes) is not enough either: “we cannot take the self-
limiting consent of sovereign nations to be the basic ground of international law”.124  
Something even more basic than that must provide justification for international law.  
Remember that the purpose of law is to give justification for its use of force in Dworkin’s 
theory. Just as Dworkin justified the use of force in municipal law, the justification of 
force must figure in a view of international law as law. 
 He begins on much the same note as Hart.  There is no structure as yet in place in 
international law as to properly understand it in the normal terms of courts, legislation, 
and effective sanctions.  But before giving up (and conceding that his position results in 
the same conclusion as Hart’s), Dworkin, ever the philosopher, again draws upon a 
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thought experiment to illustrate his claims.  Imagine that there is an international court 
with jurisdiction over the entire globe; cases can easily be brought before this court, and 
effective sanctions can be enforced through an international police force.  “If we can 
imagine such a court…then we can frame a tractable question of political morality”,125 
writes Dworkin, and proceeds to lay out ways in which this could be possible.  His 
thought experiment is decidedly based on moral questions, such as what laws this court 
can “appropriately…enforce coercively”.126 A government is illegitimate, he asserts, if it 
violates the basic human rights of its own citizens, or when it cannot protect those people 
within its borders from attacks from outside.127  A state would therefore, he claims, 
“improve its legitimacy if it helped to facilitate an international order that would help 
itself and others do this, and so if this were so would have a political obligation to do 
so”.128  Furthermore, states fail their citizens when they accept an international 
organization that makes it harder for the international community to assist in economic, 
commercial, medical, or environmental disasters, 129 since he writes that individuals have 
a basic desire to help others during these crises.  This, Dworkin writes, is in his view “the 
true moral basis of international law”130, that states have the same responsibilities and 
moral duties, to a feasible extent, to other governments (citizens in the international 
community) as they do to members of their own communities.  This calls for a more 
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complex system of international law that allows for this truly global system of 
intervention.131 
 Since a coercive municipal government has a standing moral duty to improve its 
legitimacy, it seems to be the case that a system of international law does as well, and this 
can only be accomplished by individual sovereign states working together.  This could 
potentially be a legitimate background reason for improving international law.  However, 
there would undoubtedly be disagreement as to what principles should prevail in making 
international law the best it can be.  Dworkin thus introduces the principle of salience; 
that is: 
  If a significant number of states, encompassing a significant population, has  
 developed an agreed code of practice, either by treaty or other form of   
 coordination, then other states have at least a prima facie duty to subscribe to that  
 practice as well, with the important proviso that this duty holds only if a more  
 general practice to that effect, expanded in that way, would improve the   
 legitimacy of the subscribing state and the international order as a whole.132 
 Therefore, “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”133 must 
grow more prevalent, and thus can align with other nations.  Dworkin uses the example 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights134 to show that if a humane set of 
principles gains wide acceptance, other nations have a duty to embrace and abide by 
those principles.  “As more nations recognize a duty to recognize and follow widely 
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accepted principles, those principles…have greater moral gravitational force”.135  This 
theory goes along with Dworkin’s principle of law as integrity, and the importance of 
consistency and adherence to general moral principles.  On this account, the sources of 
law above in the Article flow from moral demands, and are taken to be more fundamental 
than consent, which Hart cites as his view of how states accept international law as 
law.136   Dworkin writes that “the charter and institutions of the United Nations are best 
understood not as arrangements binding only through contract or on signatories but as an 
order all nations now have a moral obligation to treat as law”.137  This obligation does not 
result from consent, but by the moral force of salience as a way to a justified social order.  
Dworkin thus concludes that this principle of salience is fundamental in establishing the 
justification of international law; it is justified through the moral force of salient 
principles.  This makes the principle of salience different from mere consent; salient 
principles carry moral weight, and have greater weight as they grow more salient.  
Therefore, Dworkin uses the principle of salience to rescue international law from a lack 
of justification.  Salient moral principles added to mere rules illustrates this better 
explanation of the justification of international law.  
 At this point, we have reached a somewhat different conclusion than Hart through 
our analysis (with Dworkin’s help) of international law from an expanded view with rules 
and principles.  Through examining the moral legitimacy of international law, and not 
merely its formal structure, we have reached a different theory for the present and future 
of international law.  There is very little possibility, under Hart’s theory, that the 
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sovereign states would ever consent to an international police force, courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction, and enforceable sanctions.  A descriptive theory like Hart’s 
lacks the development to account for law, and cannot fully account for the formal 
differences between municipal and international law.  Dworkin’s theory, however, better 
accounts for these differences and shows how international law can lack certain formal 
characteristics, yet still be law, and shows how international law can be justified.  It 
shows how it could eventually evolve toward those formal features and institutions.  The 
content of the norms of international law can be explicated and justified by reference to 
moral principles, particularly salient principles such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  States recognize the prominence of these institutions and conventions, 
and could recognize (after some time of course) the importance of the formal 
characteristics of municipal law (a police force, enforceable sanctions, etc.) as part of 
international law, particularly if they understood this importance through the established, 
salient moral principles of other countries.  This helps get our theory of international law 
to explain and justify coercion on a global scale.   
 Presently in international law, the global legal community is seemingly powerless 
to enact real change, and even more so is seemingly unjustified through solely the 
popular consent argument. Though some critics (including McCarthy) assert that 
international law is not law at all, I agree with Hart that there is enough binding force in 
international laws for international law to qualify.  Yet it is a small victory, because I also 
agree with Dworkin that there must be more to law than just rules, and there must be 
some justification for these rules in principle. If international law can be said to be 
justified through salient principles, and the future of international law can look like 
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Dworkin describes (with states accepting as salient a justified international police force 
and courts with compulsory jurisdiction), this view of international law provides a more 
powerful and effective view for international law in the future as well as the present.  
Dworkin’s theory thus (after a fashion) gets us to a better understanding and justification 
for international law than Hart’s, and gets us to a point at which international law 
acquires a more dominant and altogether better place in the global community. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 I have questioned whether international law is really law, and if it is, how and to 
what extent we can understand it as such.  Through my analysis of Hart and Dworkin’s 
conceptions of law, I have reached their answers to these questions, and have drawn my 
own final conclusion.  My conclusion is that while Hart and Dworkin both rightly 
conclude that international law is indeed law proper, though not fully realized, Dworkin’s 
theory and its incorporation of salient moral principles better explains how international 
law can have fundamental formal differences from municipal law and yet still be both 
law proper and justified law.  Under his theory, in a futuristic evolved landscape where 
nations accept these institutions as salient, international law can acquire the more formal 
characteristics of municipal law.  Salience is different from mere consent in that salient 
principles have moral weight.  Without the incorporation of these principles, Hart’s 
theory seems to fall short of ever reaching what seems to be an ever-increasingly 
important goal: the creation of enforceable sanctions, courts with distinct and defined 
legislation, and other components of a system that is closer in form to municipal law.  
While he would perhaps argue that he is not trying to reach that goal, I would respond 
that his purely descriptive theory falls short of fully accounting for the normative nature 
of law, and of accounting for international law’s status as a system of laws today, and 
thus Dworkin’s theory better explains the nature of international law. 
  77 
 Now, I wish to conclude the project by summarizing both Hart and Dworkin’s 
arguments, once again showing (in an abbreviated fashion) how they reached their 
conclusions about international law.  Hart began by arguing that Austin failed to account 
for basic legal phenomena like rules, obligations, and rights of citizens under the law, and 
instead claimed that law was simply orders backed by the threats of a legally unlimited 
sovereign.  Therefore, Hart developed the idea of citizens acting in both private and 
public capacities, thus comprising a legally limited government.  Instead of law as a 
system of commands issued by an unlimited sovereign, Hart introduced the concept of 
law as a system of primary (rules issuing commands) and secondary rules (power-
conferring rules and rules to allow for the modification of the primary rules).  Hart also 
discussed his influential and ultimate secondary rule, the “rule of recognition”, which 
would be a rule which identifies valid sources of law. 
 Hart showed that while international law lacked a rule of recognition (among 
other formal components), it was not necessary for the system to have these components; 
though he argued that international law was a more primitive system than municipal law 
because of this.  Hart argued that international law was still law, though underdeveloped, 
because international law covered different subjects (sovereign states), which behave 
differently than private individuals.  There is nevertheless significant pressure to conform 
to the primary rules of international law, and though there are extremely limited 
enforceable sanctions or international police forces, this pressure is enough to make 
international law binding and thus obligatory.   International law, in the end, can most 
certainly be understood as law, but it must be understood as a legal system that is more 
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primitive and underdeveloped than municipal law.  At this point, Hart’s theory runs out, 
and he cannot help us further. 
 Dworkin argues against Hart’s “model of rules”.  Instead, Dworkin argues that 
there are important, fundamental principles (justice, fairness, and procedural due process) 
that must be incorporated into judicial decisions, and that these principles must be 
moderated by the principle of integrity.  Law as integrity stipulates that legal decisions 
should be consistent in principle to be legally correct, and that through this consistency in 
principle judges should decide cases in order that their decisions will continue to make 
the legal system the best that it can be.  In using the chain novel illustration, Dworkin 
shows how law as integrity helps the legal system be the best it can be, as long as judges 
rely on their moral convictions and the principle of integrity.   The question of how 
judges can and should rely on their own convictions was answered by his right answer 
thesis, in which he maintained that there is always an objectively right answer, and that 
given enough time and the proper interpretation, a perfect judge would reach it.  This was 
a questionable doctrine, but it showcased Dworkin’s views on objective truth and the 
importance of principle in adjudication. 
 In Dworkin’s view of international law, he maintained that the real question is not 
whether international law is really law (he said that of course it is, even though it lacks 
some formal characteristics), but what is the justification for international law?  He said 
that mere consent is not satisfactory for justification because it violates those states that 
have not consented but are still under the jurisdiction of international law.  Indeed, this 
lack of justification from consent proves (from critics like McCarthy’s perspective) that 
international law lacks some necessary component to be effective law. Therefore, 
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Dworkin argued using a thought experiment for a principled, justified approach to 
international law in which states recognized salient moral principles.  This salience 
differs from mere consent in that these salient principles have moral weight, and the more 
states that accept these principles, the greater is the duty states have to embrace and 
adhere to them. This thought experiment further enabled Dworkin’s arguments to go 
beyond the underdeveloped, unjustified form of international law that Hart conceived and 
into a system of international law that is justified through salient principles, and one 
which in the future could contain the components of coercion we listed above, and the 
justification for them.  Dworkin’s theory helps to explain how these principles (such as 
integrity) and past legal decisions fully work together to justify international law (through 
states’ working with established, salient moral principles). 
 Thus, Dworkin ultimately came to a conclusion which was different from Hart’s.  
International law could claim legitimacy and justification for its coercion of states which 
have not ratified or become parties to treaties and conventions that allow for such 
coercion, because they (like citizens in Dworkin’s view of a municipal legal system) are 
part of a legal system that has accepted these salient moral principles as combined with 
rules of law.  Ultimately, Hart’s arguments lead to the conclusion that international law 
seems to be limited binding guidelines rather than a developed legal system, and does not 
account for the normativity of such a system or its justification for coercion, while 
Dworkin’s arguments (which incorporate salient moral principles with rules) seem to 
conclude that salient international laws have moral weight and thus are an effective and 
justified part of the global community.  I agree that, in order for international law to reach 
the point at which it is both necessarily influential and justified, there must be salient 
  80 
moral principles justifying its coercion and the laws that follow from it.  I agree with 
Dworkin that genuine law involves the justified enforcement of certain publicly identified 
norms, and that it is impossible to separate the nature of law from the justification of the 
institution.  In this view, international law would end in a global organization which 
could bring about real change and powerfully maintain world peace and equality for all 
human beings. 
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APPENDIX 
 “Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants 
under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war 
against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject 
it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse 
between their nationals and 
the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, 
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State 
and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be 
the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned 
what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally 
contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League. The 
Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the 
financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise 
the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will 
mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their 
number by the covenant- breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to 
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League 
which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League. Any Member of the 
League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a 
Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all 
the other Members of the League represented thereon.” - Article 16 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, 28 April 1919 
 
“CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION 
 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before 
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, 
call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, 
claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account 
of failure to comply with such provisional measures. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
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Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 43 
    All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on 
its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
    Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their 
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to 
be provided. 
    The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative 
of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and 
Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to 
ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes. 
Article 44 
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a 
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations 
assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in 
the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that 
Member's armed forces. 
Article 45 
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall 
hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international 
enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans 
for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special 
agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 46 
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the 
assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 
Article 47 
    There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security 
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces 
placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 
    The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent 
members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United 
Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee 
to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities 
requires the participation of that Member in its work. 
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    The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the 
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. 
Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 
    The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after 
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees. 
Article 48 
    The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the 
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 
    Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying 
out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
Article 50 
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security 
Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds 
itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those 
measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of 
those problems. 
Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.” - Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  84 
REFERENCES 
"Charter, United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,  
 Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web.  
 27 Feb. 2015. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1986. Print. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. Print. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. "The Model of Rules." Yale Law School Legal Scholarship   
 Repository (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 18 Feb. 2015. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. "A New Philosophy for International Law." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 31  
 Mar. 2015. 
Dworkin, Ronald M. "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." - Wiley Online  
 Library. N.p., n.d. Web. 4 Jan. 2015. 
Green, Leslie. "Introduction." Introduction. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon,  
 1961. N. pag. Print. 
Hart, H. L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. Print. 
International Court of Justice. Statute of the Court. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 Feb. 2015. 
League of Nations. "Covenant of the League of Nations." The Covenant of the League of 
 Nations, 28 April 1919, Available At: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
 3dd8b9854.html (n.d.): 10-16. Web. 28 Feb. 2015. 
McCarthy, Andrew. "Obama Can't Force His Iran Deal on the Country without  
Congress's Consent, by Andrew C. McCarthy, National Review." National  
Review Online. National Review, 14 Mar. 2015. Web. 15 Mar. 2015. 
  85 
"NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview." NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview. N.p.,  
 n.d. Web. 21 Jan. 2015.] 
UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2015. www.un.org 
 
